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ABSTRACT 
 
We analyse the impact of R&D cooperation on firm performance differentiating between four types of 
R&D partners (competitors, suppliers, customers, and universities & research institutes), and considering 
two performance measures: labour productivity and productivity in innovative (new to the market) sales. 
Using data on a large sample of Dutch innovating firms in two waves of the Community Innovation 
Survey (1996, 1998), we examine the impact of R&D (collaboration) in 1996 on subsequent productivity 
growth in 1996-1998. We find that supplier and competitor cooperation have a significant impact on 
labour productivity growth, while competitor cooperation and collaboration with universities & research 
institutes positively affects growth in innovative sales per employee. Innovative sales are furthermore 
stimulated by incoming spillovers (not due to collaboration) from customers and universities. The results 
confirm a major heterogeneity in the rationales and goals of R&D cooperation, with competitor and 
supplier cooperation focused on incremental innovations improving the productivity performance of firms, 
while university cooperation and again competitor cooperation are instrumental in creating and bringing to 
market radical innovations generating sales or products that are novel to the market, improving the growth 
performance of firms.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The observed substantial increase in R&D alliances in the late 1980s and throughout 
1990s, in particular sectors such as biotechnology and information technology (Hagedoorn, 2002; 
Tyler and Steensma, 1995) has provoked a substantial academic and policy interest in the 
phenomenon. A large body of literature in the management domain has been produced that 
discusses various motives that incite firms to collaborate on R&D (Contractor and Lorange, 
2002; Nooteboom, 1999). In parallel, a body of theoretical literature has been developed in 
industrial organization focusing on the relationship between knowledge spillovers and R&D 
cooperation and, alternatively, knowledge spillovers and R&D investments, using a game 
theoretical perspective. The latter literature has been most concerned with the potential impact of 
R&D cooperation and knowledge spillovers on R&D investment levels, and has largely been 
restricted to the analysis of cooperation with direct competitors. By and large, the findings 
suggest that cooperation is induced by knowledge spillovers and in turn leads to higher R&D 
investment levels. 
A number of empirical studies have explored the determinants of R&D cooperation (e.g. 
Kleinknecht and Reinen, 1992; Fritsch and Lucas, 2001; Tether, 2002; Belderbos et al. 2003). A 
major finding of recent contributions is that the goals and, hence, the determinants of R&D 
partnerships differ depending on the type of cooperation and partner. Fritsch and Lucas (2001) 
find for German manufacturing firms that innovative effort directed at process improvement is 
more likely to involve collaborate with suppliers, whereas product innovations is associated with 
customer collaboration. Tether (2002), using UK data on innovating firms, finds that cooperation 
is mostly associated with firms pursuing radical rather than incremental innovations. 
Distinguishing more specifically between partnerships with competitors, suppliers, customers, 
and universities & research institutes, Belderbos et al. (2003) finds substantial heterogeneity in 
the determinants to establish R&D collaborations with the different partners. Cooperation with a 
type of partner generally is more likely to be chosen if such type of partner is considered an 
important source of knowledge for the innovation process, while more basic knowledge sourced 
from universities and research institutes positively impacts all types of cooperation. Collaboration 
with universities is more likely to be chosen by more R&D intensive firms in sectors that exhibit 
faster technological and product developments. 
Surprisingly, the key question whether collaborative R&D has the expected positive 
impact on firms’ (innovation) performance has remained largely unexplored in both the industrial 
organization as well in the management literature (e.g. Tether, 2002; Das and Teng, 2000). A 
number of papers have included a cooperation variable in empirical models explaining 
differences in firms’ innovation output (Janz et al., 2003; Van Leeuwen and Klomp, 2001; 
Klomp and van Leeuwen, 2001; Lööf and Heshmati, 2002; Monjon and Waelbroeck, 2003; 
Criscuolo and Haskell, 2003), but most of these studies have been primarily concerned with the 
impact of R&D investments on performance and did not examine systematically differences in 
impacts across cooperation types.2 Management studies have restricted analysis on particular 
performance indicators in specific industries, e.g. the effect of alliances on high tech start-up firm 
                                                 
2 Most of these studies use a simultaneous equations approach pioneered by Crépon et al (1998) in which innovative 
sales levels in turn are allowed to impact productivity or sales. In the current paper we allow R&D (cooperation) to 
have a direct impact on productivity. 
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performance in the biotech industry (Baum et al. 2002), or the effect of learning in alliances on 
market share performance in the global automotive industry (Dussauge et al., 2002). 
The contribution of this paper is to examine in detail the effects of different types of R&D 
cooperation on firm performance. We consider the impact of the four major types of partner-
specific cooperation strategies: cooperation with competitors, suppliers, customers, and research 
institutes and & universities. We analyse the effects on these R&D partnerships on two 
alternative performance measures for a large sample of Dutch firms active in manufacturing and 
service industries: growth of value added per employee (labour productivity), and growth of sales 
per employee from products new to the market (which we term ‘innovative sales productivity’). 
The analysis controls for the impact on productivity of incoming knowledge spillovers that not 
due to R&D partnerships, as well as the effect of the firms’ own R&D expenditures. Using data 
on a large sample of innovating firms in two waves of the biannual Dutch Community Innovation 
Surveys (1996, 1998) linked to production statistics, we mitigate problems of simultaneity and 
unobserved firm-specific effects by examining the impact of R&D (collaboration) in 1996 on 
subsequent productivity growth in 1996-1998.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section two provides an overview of 
the previous theoretical and empirical literature discussing the impact of R&D (cooperation) and 
spillovers on firm performance. Section three describes the empirical model and data. Section 
four discusses the empirical results and section five concludes.  
 
2. Previous Literature 
 
In this section we will briefly review the theoretical and empirical literature on R&D 
cooperation, spillovers and productivity. Theoretical models in the industrial organization 
tradition have shown how knowledge spillovers increase the stock of effective knowledge of the 
firms and contribute to profitability by either by expanding demand or by reducing costs. 
Involuntary spillovers between competing firms at the same time provide an incentive for R&D 
cooperation as this enables firms to overcome the disincentive effect on R&D from the 
externality that involuntary spillovers to rival firms constitute (e.g. Amir, 2000; De Bondt, 1996; 
Kamien et al., 1992; Suzumura, 1992; Leahy & Neary, 1997). Recent papers have also taken into 
account that spillovers are not given but that cooperation allows firms to increase knowledge 
transfers voluntarily among the cooperating partners (Katsoulacos & Ulph, 1998). Firms have 
incentives to manage the flow of spillovers to and from competitors by attempting to maximize 
incoming spillovers through R&D collaboration while at the same time minimizing outgoing 
spillovers through investments in knowledge protection (Cassiman et al. 2002; Martin 1999, 
Amir et al. 2003). The industrial organization literature has paid little attention to collaboration 
between firms that are not directly competing on output markets. An exception is Atallah (2002), 
who finds that even with small vertical spillovers (knowledge spillovers between upstream and 
downstream industries) firms can profitably to engage in vertical R&D cooperation, as there are 
fewer or no competitive considerations involved with potential leakage’s of the fruits of larger 
R&D investments.  
The literature in the management and technology policy domain has examined broader 
motivations for R&D cooperation than internalising involuntary knowledge spillovers and has 
focused more on voluntary spillovers. Explanations for collaborative R&D that have been 
extensively discussed revolve around such factors as sharing risks and costs in the face of 
uncertain technological developments (Das and Teng, 2002; Tyler and Steensma, 1995), 
shortening innovation cycles (Pisano, 1990), the pursuit of efficiency gains such as economies of 
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scope and scale or synergistic effects through efficient pooling of the firm’ resources (Kogut, 
1988; Das and Teng, 2000), learning through monitoring technology and market developments 
(Hamel, 1991; Roberts and Berry, 1985), dealing with regulations and industry standards, and 
responding to government subsidy policies (Benfratello and Sembenelli, 2003; Nakamura, 2003). 
Although it has been noted more generally that a substantial share of alliances fail (Harrigan, 
1986), R&D alliances may be a source of competitive advantage and have long lasting effects on 
firm performance. Teece (1980) argues that organizational practices affect firms’ performance 
and can explain sustained performance differences within industries due to slow diffusion of best 
practices and difficulties in imitating complex organizational capabilities. It has also been 
suggested that different types of collaboration may serve different purposes, where the two main 
goals of innovative effort are cost reduction and market expansion. Collaboration with customers 
is important to reduce the risk associated with market introductions of the innovations, as has 
been recognized since Von Hippel (1988). In particular when products are novel and complex 
and hence require adaptations in use by customers, collaboration may be essential to ensure 
market expansion (Tether, 2002). In contrast, cooperation with suppliers is often related to the 
tendency to focus on core business to reduce costs, with outsourcing activities coupled with 
cooperation on input quality improvements aimed at further cost reductions. Cooperation with 
universities and research institutes is generally more aimed at radical breakthrough innovations 
that may open up entire new markets or market segments (Tether, 2002; Monjon and 
Waelbroeck, 2003).  
A number of empirical studies have found a positive impact of engaging in R&D 
cooperation on innovation performance i.e. sales of innovative products (e.g. Klomp and van 
Leeuwen, 2001; Janz et al., 2003; van Leeuwen, 2002; Lööf and Heshmati, 2002; Criscuolo and 
Haskell, 2003), patenting (Vanhaverbeke et al., 2004), and sales growth (Cincera et al. 
forthcoming). Some of these papers have also examined the effect of different cooperation types 
but with ambiguous results. Monjon and Waelbroeck (2003) regressed innovative sales levels of 
firms in a French CIS survey on a range of collaboration and spillovers and found a mixture of 
negative and positive impacts of R&D cooperation and spillovers. Cincera et al. (forthcoming) 
distinguish between overseas and domestic collaboration by Belgian firms and find a positive 
impact on productivity of the latter but a counter-intuitive negative impact of the former. Lööf 
and Heshmati (2002) include a selected group of cooperation types in an innovation output 
equation for Swedish firms and found that cooperation with competitors and universities impact 
output levels positively while cooperation with customers had a negative effect. These 
ambiguous results can be partly attributed to the difficulties in allowing for different appropriate 
lags with which cooperative R&D impacts innovative output and performance (cf. Cincera et al., 
forthcoming), as well as unobserved firm traits that impact both firms’ incentives to cooperate 
and their innovative output (Van Leeuwen and Klomp, 2001).  
There is a large body of empirical literature examining the sources of productivity growth 
and in particular the role of inter-firm knowledge spillovers (e.g. Adams and Jaffe, 1996; 
Branstetter, 2001; Coe and Helpman, 1995; Basant and Flikkert, 1996). These studies have 
generally confirmed an important role of inferred spillovers on productivity growth. Similarly, 
empirical studies have documented the positive impact of own R&D on productivity at the firm 
level (e.g. Grilliches and Mairesse, 1984; Lichtenberg and Siegel, 1991; Hall and Mairesse, 
1995). A related literature has been concerned with the role of foreign multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) in productivity performance (Griffith, 1999; Harris and Robinson, 2003). In these 
studies MNEs are generally found to be more productive than their local industry competitors, 
which is attributed to MNEs efficient exploitation of firm-specific assets allowing for multi-plant 
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economies of scale (e.g. Pfaffermayr, 1999) and the transfer of accumulated tacit and specialized 
knowledge on production (Aitkin and Harrison, 1999). 
In summary, the literature suggests that an analysis of different types of cooperation strategies 
should take into account the different possible aims of (collaborative) R&D efforts. Productivity 
increases may be more reflective of incremental innovations and affected by collaborative R&D 
aimed at cost reductions, while sales expansion through innovative products may be more related 
to more basic R&D efforts and client collaborations. We explore this by examining in the 
empirical analysis the effect of cooperation on two different types of productivity performance: 
labour productivity growth and the growth in sales of innovative products that are new to the 
market per employee (‘innovative sales productivity’). Furthermore, we follow the suggestions in 
the literature that analysis of the performance effects of R&D cooperation should control for the 
positive impact of incoming knowledge spillovers, as well as R&D expenditures, while the 
existence of multinational group linkages should also be taken into account.  
 
3. Empirical model, data and descriptive statistics 
 
The goal of the empirical analysis is to determine whether different types of R&D 
collaboration affect firm productivity growth. To examine this effect the analysis should control 
for the impact of own R&D efforts as well as incoming knowledge flows that are not due to 
cooperation. Our specification in equation (1) has as dependent variable the growth in 
productivity from 1996 (t-1) to 1998 (t). In addition to including explanatory variables measured 
from the preceding period, limiting simultaneity bias, we include the lagged level of productivity 
(in 1996). In the absence of the possibility of including fixed firm effects, this specification has 
the major advantage that it partly adjusts for unobserved firm attributes that are relatively 
constant over time.3 We estimate the following growth in productivity equation:   
 
++++++=∆ iiiiii coopSuppcoopCustcoopComprdXprodv ___int)log( 321 ζζζδβα
+++++ iiiii spilUnivspilSuppspilCustspilCompcoopUniv _____ 43214 γγγγζ  
iiprodv εθ +)log(         (1) 
 
where all left hand side variables are measured at time t and where 
, is the growth in productivity measured as either 
value added per employee or sales generated by new to the market products per employee, 
respectively. Labour productivity growth will be most affected by cost reducing innovation, 
while innovative sales productivity growth is mostly affected by demand expansion oriented 
innovation. Differences in the impact of cooperative R&D on the two performance measures can 
demonstrate the variety in purposes of different collaborative strategies. The model includes four 
dummies for cooperation types with the different possible partners: competitors, customers, 
)log()log()log( ,1, titii prodvprodvprodv −=∆ +
                                                 
3 A second and related advantage is that it allows for the effects of the exogenous variables to be interpreted as 
Granger-causation. The Granger approach to the question of whether x causes y is to see to what extent the current y 
is explained by past values of y and then to consider whether adding lagged values of x can improve the statistical 
explanation. The variable y is said to be Granger-caused by x if the coefficients on the lagged values of x are 
statistically significant. 
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suppliers, and universities & research institutes (henceforward for convenience labelled 
‘universities’).4 The same potential partners are identified as potential sources of incoming 
knowledge spillovers. The model also includes the firm’s Innovation intensity. The lagged 
log(Prodv) term is the level term of the dependent variable taken in the base year (1996). Firms 
that are highly productive and at the frontier of productivity may be less likely to be able record 
strong growth rates in productivity than firms that are followers.5 In that case we expect θ  to fall 
within the interval [-1,0]. If θ  is zero, this effect is absent and there is no gradual convergence 
between leading firms and productivity laggards. If θ  is –1, than a productivity lead in one 
period is fully neutralized in the next and passed productivity has no impact on future 
productivity levels.6 The X-vector consists of other firm-level control variables, such as size, 
dummies controlling for foreign and domestic groups, dummies for cost reducing and product 
improving objectives of innovation, and dummies for the industry of the firm at the two-digit 
level. 
One worry is that our specification does not allow separating the effect of the incoming 
spillovers from the effect of cooperation: cooperation can have a direct effect on productivity but 
will at the same time increase the reported incoming spillovers from the collaboration partner 
firm/institution. In order to estimate the full impact of formal cooperation, we have to separate 
spillovers due to purposeful informational exchanges that arise in formal cooperative 
arrangements from spillovers that are not due to such cooperation (e.g. arising from market 
contacts with suppliers and customers). We extract the former spillovers due to collaboration by 
taking as the spillover measure the residuals obtained from regressing the spillover variables on 
the corresponding cooperation variable and the set of industry dummies.  
 
(2)  compiiihori ZcoopCompspilComp ηλ ++= __
(3)  custiiicusti ZcoopCustspilCust ηλ ++= __
(4)  piiipi ZcoopSuppspilSupp
sup
sup __ ηλ ++=
(5)  univiiiinsti ZcoopUnivspilUniv ηλ ++= __
 
The estimated residuals from these equations  through are then included in 
place of the spillover variables through in our specification. The 
residuals are no longer systematically related to firms’ R&D collaborations and are not due to 
purposeful exchanges in R&D partnerships.
comp
tηˆ univiηˆ
ispilComp _ ispilUniv _
7
                                                 
4 We do not include cooperation with consultants in the empirical analysis because of its heterogeneous character 
and doubts whether linkages with consultants are genuine R&D efforts. 
5 Since the model includes a full set of industry dummies, this variable can also be interpreted as the effect of the 
productivity level of the firm relative to the industry mean in 1996. 
6 To see this one can simply rewrite the relevant part of (1) as tit prodvprodv ))(1.....()log( 1 θ+=+  
7 Whereas the four spillover sources included in the model identify the source, there are a number of other types of 
incoming spillovers in the CIS survey that identify the channel of the spillover (databases, trade fairs, patents). There 
is a clear and arguably substantial overlap in these measures (if information from competitors is important, it may 
reach the firm through patents or trade shows) making it problematic to include all types of spillovers available in the 
survey. We did include a composite measure of all other spillover ratings by the firm in the model, but this variable 
proved insignificant with no impact on the estimates of the four source-specific spillover measures and was omitted 
in the final specification. The source-specific spillovers are apparently able to capture the lion’s share of the impact 
of incoming knowledge to productivity growth. 
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Data and Variables 
 
The empirical analysis uses the data from two consecutive Community Innovation 
Surveys (CIS) from 1996 and 1998 and Production Statistics data from 1996 and 1998. It has 
been only recently that researchers have been able to utilize consecutive CIS surveys merged 
with production statistics.8 An additional advantage of the Dutch CIS surveys is that they have 
been held every other year rather than in four-year intervals as has been customary in other EU 
countries. This allows us to more accurately examine performance changes over a suitable time 
frame (two years). The Netherlands Bureau of Statistics (CBS) production statistics database 
includes information on output, employment, and value added. The CIS database contains 
information concerning R&D and innovation activities of the firm, including innovation 
expenditures, innovation in partnership data and sources of knowledge used in the innovation 
process. The CIS and production statistics surveys are sent to all large firms and to a random 
sample of smaller firms in the Netherlands. To create a two-year (panel) data set 6327 innovating 
firms in 1998 are matched with information on these firms in 1996 survey: 2353 firms could be 
linked to 1996 survey and were classified as innovating firms in that survey. We then link these 
firms via a unique id number to the production statistics data. The data are at the establishment 
level and include manufacturing as well as service firms. Due to the missing values for some of 
the explanatory variables the complete sample includes 2056 firms.  
The labour productivity growth variable is the growth in net value added per employee 
(drawn from the production statistics) between 1996 and 1998. The alternative performance 
measure ‘innovation sales productivity growth’ is the growth in the value of sales of product and 
services that are new to the market per employee, between 1996 and 1998. This variable is drawn 
from the CIS surveys, in which firms are asked to indicate what percentage of sales has been due 
products or services introduced in the passed two years that were new to the industry, not just 
novel to the firm. Firms that increase the performance on this variable are likely to be more 
productive in the pursuit of more radical innovations. These in turn are a prerequisite for further 
firm growth (Klomp and Van Leeuwen, 2001).  
The cooperation variables are taken from the 1996 CIS survey and are dummy variables 
taking the value one if the firm indicated that it was or had been engaged during 1994-1996 in 
active R&D cooperation with competitors, suppliers, customers, and universities or research 
institutes, respectively. Hence we posit that cooperative R&D projects in 1994-1996 have their 
main impact on productivity growth in the two-year period 1996-1998. This is a relatively 
plausible assumption, given that R&D effects require some time to translate into innovative 
output and productivity advances. But it is not ruled out that some cooperative projects may lead 
to faster impacts on productivity. If this is the case, then early R&D projects (e.g. those started in 
or before 1994) may already have had their impact on 1996 productivity levels and show no 
further impact in 1996-1998, in which case the empirical results will underestimate the impact of 
cooperation. In order to address this empirically, we also test for the impact of an alternative 
cooperation measure: whether a firm is a ‘consistent’ R&D collaborator: i.e. whether the firm is 
cooperating with the respective type of partner both in 1996 and 1998. If cooperative projects 
have a relatively quick impact on productivity, the persistent cooperation variables may show 
more robust results. 
                                                 
8 Other examples are Belderbos et al. (2003) and Klomp and Van Leeuwen (2001). 
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The firm-specific and type-specific of incoming spillovers are direct measures of the 
importance of source of incoming knowledge for the firms’ innovation process. The CIS survey 
asks firms to rate on a Likert scale (1-5) the importance of various external sources of 
information in terms of the effectiveness in the firms’ innovation process in the past two years. 
Given the exact wording of the question on sources of incoming knowledge, i.e. their effective 
use in the innovation activities, the answers are more an indicator of their contribution to 
innovation output than in indicators of innovation inputs. Hence, such effective spillovers in 
1994-1996 (the 1996 CIS survey) are more likely to affect 1996 productivity levels than 1996-
1998 productivity growth. We therefore do not include the spillover measure for 1996 but the 
spillover measures from the 1998 survey (effective spillovers during 1996-1998) as having an 
impact on 1996-1998 productivity growth. As discussed above, we do not use the scores as 
explanatory variables but adjust the spillover measures for the impact of cooperation. We regress 
the 1998 spillover rates by source on 1996 cooperation and a set of industry dummies, and take 
the residuals of these equations as a the measure of spillovers that are not due to purposeful 
exchanges in formal R&D partnerships.  
We also include an R&D input measure in line with the previous literature that 
documented a positive relationship between research intensity and productivity. Our R&D 
measure is total innovation expenditures as percentage of sales. Such expenditures include, in 
addition to internal R&D, expenditures on extramural R&D contracts paid to other firms and 
research centres, expenditures on licenses and hence also controls for the impact of external 
technology sourcing.9 Innovation intensity is taken from the 1996 survey to allow for a 2-year 
period in which 1996 innovation investments can impact productivity. 
Further control variables include a set of 2-digit industry dummies (we distinguish 19 
industries) and firm size (the logarithm of the number of employees). We also allow for different 
productivity growth performance between independent firms and firms that are part of a domestic 
group or a foreign MNE. Group firms may have higher growth if they can draw on technology 
and organizational expertise from headquarters and other groups firms. The Dutch industrial 
structure is characterized by the presence of several very large multinational corporations. The 
large Dutch companies Akzo/Nobel, DSM, Philips, Shell and Unilever are dominating in terms of 
R&D expenditures, and are important elements in the Dutch technological infrastructure. These 
large companies are characterized as the core of firm networks with comparable research 
intensities (i.e. Cowan and Jonard 1999; Verspagen, 2000) and greater density of knowledge 
spillovers.  
Finally, we include demand-pull and cost-push variables in the model as controls. The 
demand-pull variable is a sum of scores on importance of objectives of innovation relating to 
demand. Cost-push is the sum of scores on importance of objectives relating to cost reduction. If 
cost-reduction is a major motivation for innovations efforts, it may be more likely that R&D 
translates directly into improved labour productivity. Demand expansion orientation is most 
likely to impact on new product sales productivity. 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
The distribution of cases by industry and descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. 
There are 630 firms with R&D cooperation of any type among the innovating firms in the 
                                                 
9 Data limitations did not allow us to further decompose innovation expenditures. 
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combined sample. Supplier cooperation is the most frequent, with 375 firms indicating to be 
engaged in this type of strategy, followed by customer cooperation (353 firms), university 
cooperation (280) and competitor cooperation (226). Some 1426 firms reported to have none of 
the three links. The comparison across industries indicates that the propensity to cooperate is not 
dissimilar between services and manufacturing industries. Cooperation is comparatively more 
frequent in (petro)chemicals, metallurgy, and business services. Science-based industries such as 
electronics and chemicals, but also the food and metallurgy industries, report a higher share of 
university cooperation compared to other types of cooperation. 
Table 2 provides a contingency table displaying the means of the variables used in the 
model by type of cooperation. This information provides some preliminary evidence that there 
exist significant differences along several key parameters between firms having an R&D 
cooperation link and the non-collaborating firms. Collaborating firms report substantially greater 
incoming spillovers of all four kinds compared to non-cooperating firms (the F-tests in columns 
shows that these differences are significant). With the exception of competitor spillovers, source 
specific spillovers are greatest for firms that cooperate with the source, as expected (F-tests again 
shows that these differences overall are significant). The most dramatic difference is in university 
spillovers: firms that engage in R&D collaborations with universities or research institutes report 
to receive spillovers more than twice the magnitude as spillovers benefiting non-collaborating 
firms. These figures are both indicative that the importance for the firm’s innovation process of 
knowledge coming from a specific source is reason to engage in cooperation (Belderbos et al, 
2003), but also of subsequent purposeful increases in knowledge transfers within the 
collaborative agreement. The table also shows that cooperating firms tend to be larger and more 
R&D intensive, are more often part of a domestic or foreign group, and report greater emphasis 
on cost reduction and demand expansion. Finally, collaborating firms show higher labour 
productivity levels and higher innovative sales per employee, with the latter highest for firms 
cooperating with customers and universities. . However, these simple mean comparisons cannot 
be taken as evidence of the impact of cooperation strategy on productivity, as this requires 
controlling for initial productivity levels, industry differences, and the joint impact of the other 
variables in a multivariate analysis. The results of this analysis, estimates of equations (1)-(5), are 
discussed below. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
Table 3 reports the results of all variants of equation (1) with the spillover measures 
instrumented by the error term of equations (2)-(5).10 The auxiliary regressions of spillover 
measures on the corresponding cooperation dummies in the previous period (not reported here) 
showed that cooperation is indeed a highly significant explanatory factor of the corresponding 
spillovers. For both dependent variables, labour productivity growth and innovative sales 
productivity growth, we first estimate an equation with aggregated measures of cooperation and 
spillovers, to make comparisons possible with earlier results. Results from the aggregated 
specification for labour productivity growth (model 1) strongly confirm the contribution of R&D 
cooperation to productivity growth. The cooperation variable is highly significant and positive. 
Taking the exponent of the coefficient minus one gives the proportional increase in productivity 
compared with non-cooperating firms, which amounts to a substantial 13 percent difference in 
                                                 
10 We also estimated the models with a robust regression technique to correct for possible heteroscedasticity, but 
found no non-trivial differences in standard errors compared with the least squares estimation. 
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productivity. In addition to the aggregate cooperation measure, the aggregate spillover measure 
and Innovation intensity are positive and significant. Productivity growth is also higher for 
foreign MNE-owned affiliates and (marginally) higher for domestic group firms, while firm size 
and the direction of innovative efforts (demand enhancing or cost saving) have no appreciable 
impact. The lagged productivity variable is highly significant and negative, indicating that 
productivity leaders are less able to show further productivity growth. The estimated coefficient 
indicates that a 1 percent increase in past productivity is only associated with a 0.48 (1 – 0.52) 
percent increase in current productivity.  
If spillovers and cooperation are differentiated by type of partner and source in model 2, only 
competitor cooperation is found to have an independent positive impact on labour productivity 
growth. If the cooperation dummy takes the value one only for persistent collaborators (both in 
1996 and 1998) both competitor and supplier cooperation are found to have positive and 
significant impacts (model 3). In model 2, the individual source-specific spillovers are not 
significant, but in model 3, university spillovers do have a marginally significant and positive 
impact. 
Models 4-6 present the results with the dependent variable the growth in firms’ 
productivity in generating sales of innovative products new to the market per employee. In the 
aggregate specification (model 4), again cooperation and spillovers are significant contributors to 
this type of productivity growth, but in the differentiated equations (models 5 and 6) we see 
different impacts of the different cooperation types. Now it is university cooperation that has a 
significant impact on productivity growth and competitor cooperation gets a marginally 
significant impact for persistent collaborators (model 6). In addition, clear contributions are 
confirmed by spillovers (not due to cooperation) from universities and from customers. 
Surprisingly, innovation intensity has no significant impact here, but larger firms are more 
successful in obtaining this type of productivity growth. Affiliates of foreign multinationals again 
are able to record systematically higher productivity growth (albeit only marginally significant), 
but domestic group membership has no effect. The cost and demand orientation of innovative 
efforts matter strongly for productivity growth in the expected direction. A demand orientation is 
more likely to translate into growth in new product sales, but a cost orientation has a negative 
impact. Firms that devote more R&D efforts to cost reduction are not able to devote a much 
attention to market expansion and perform less in this type of productivity growth. Lagged 
productivity has a significantly negative impact with a coefficient of 0.72, indicating that a 1 
percent increase in past productivity is only associated with a 0.28 (1 – 0.72) percent increase in 
current productivity. This shows that a past leading performance in innovative sales productivity 
is more difficult to sustain than labour productivity. 
Overall, the results show that R&D cooperation, Innovation intensity, and incoming 
spillovers all have independent impacts on productivity growth (with the exception of Innovation 
intensity in the innovative sales equations). The results diverge once spillovers and cooperation 
are differentiated by source and partner. The direction of this divergence corresponds to our 
priors concerning the purposes of different types of collaboration. R&D cooperation with 
suppliers appears more of an incremental nature focused on reducing input costs and assembly 
processes, and therewith labour productivity. Cooperation with universities is more focused on 
radical innovation and creating new products, improving innovative sales productivity. 
Competitor collaboration is the only type of collaboration that has multiple purposes and impacts, 
effective in generating both labour productivity increases (e.g. through cost sharing in R&D) and 
innovative sales productivity increases (e.g. enabling the start of innovation projects through risk 
sharing and improving sales through the establishment of technological standards). Customer 
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cooperation, in contrast, is not found to have any discernable impact on productivity growth: 
apparently, the information on customer demands and technological requirements is already 
effectively captured by incoming spillovers from customers through market transactions, and do 
not require formal collaborative R&D agreements. The role of universities in firms’ productivity 
performance also stands out, as it is the only source of knowledge that both provides effective 
public spillovers (not due to collaboration) and improves firms’ innovative sales productivity 
through formal R&D cooperation.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Despite a growing literature on R&D cooperation in both the fields of management and 
industrial economics, surprisingly little evidence has emerged on the performance effect of R&D 
collaboration. This paper analyses the impact of R&D cooperation on firm performance jointly 
with the impact of R&D expenditure and the effect of incoming spillovers that are not due to 
formal collaborative agreements. We differentiate between the type of R&D partner (competitors, 
suppliers, customers, and universities & research institutes) and consider two performance 
measures: labour productivity and productivity in innovative sales new to the market. Using data 
on a large sample of Dutch innovating firms in two waves of Community Innovation Survey 
(1996, 1998), we mitigate problems of simultaneity and unobserved firm-specific effects by 
examining the impact of R&D (collaboration) on productivity growth in 1996-1998. We find that 
supplier and competitor cooperation have a significant impact on labour productivity growth, 
while cooperation with customers and universities & research institutes positively affects growth 
in sales per employee of products and services new to the market. New product sales are 
furthermore stimulated by incoming spillovers (not due to collaboration) from customers and 
universities & research institutes. The results are sensitive to the lag with which innovation 
strategies are allowed to impact productivity growth. Generally, allowing for a more variable lag 
structure by examining the impact of cooperation strategies that are sustained over a 2-4 year 
longer period demonstrated a substantially more robust impact of cooperation on productivity.  
The results confirm a major heterogeneity in the rationales and goals of R&D 
cooperation, with competitor and supplier cooperation focused on incremental innovations 
improving the productivity performance of firms, while university cooperation and again 
competitor cooperation are instrumental in creating and bringing to market radical innovations, 
generating sales of products that are novel to the market, and hence improving the growth 
performance of firms (Klomp and Van Leeuwen, 2001). The findings provide qualified support 
for the notion that that cooperating firms are generally engaged in higher level innovative 
activities (Thether, 2002). This holds unequivocally for firms collaborating with universities (e.g. 
to get access to basic research) and competitors (to allow R&D for risky projects), but not for 
firms engaged in ‘vertical cooperation’ with suppliers and customers. If the latter types of 
cooperation are also partly focused on more radical innovations, than at least there is no evidence 
in our analysis that these efforts are effective in improving firms’ performance in bringing novel 
products to the market.  
The findings go some way in explaining the variety of results obtained in previous 
empirical work on the effect of cooperation on innovative sales and productivity, where single 
performance measures were used and no (variation in) lag structures could be examined because 
of the cross section nature of the data (e.g. Heshmati and Lööf, 2002; Monjon and Waelbroeck, 
2003). Since different R&D strategies can impact performance with different lag structures, 
future research should explore the different possible intertemporal structure of the impact of 
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R&D strategies on innovation output and firm performance. The increasing availability of 
consecutive CIS surveys will allow for the construction of panel data sets to examine the 
effectiveness of various innovation strategies in more detail. 
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Table 1. Distribution of firms across industries and R&D cooperation strategies 
NACE  Sector No. of 
obs. in  
sample 
Share 
% 
Share  
non- 
coop 
No 
of 
obs 
Share if  
COcoop=1
No 
of 
obs 
Share if  
Scoop=1
No 
of 
obs 
Share if  
CUcoop=1
No 
of 
obs 
Share if  
Ucoop=1
No 
of 
obs 
              
   11,14  Mining 6 0.3 0.4 5 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.4 1 
   15,16  Food 134 6.5 6.4 91 7.5 17 8.3 31 7.1 25 10.7 30 
  17 – 19  Textile 51 2.5 2.7 38 2.7 6 2.4 9 2.0 7 2.9 8 
     21  Paper 59 2.9 2.7 38 3.5 8 4.3 16 3.4 12 4.6 13 
     22  Printing, 
publishing 
69            3.4 3.9 56 1.3 3 2.1 8 1.1 4 0.7 2
   23,24  Petroleum and 
chemicals 
93            4.5 3.5 50 4.9 11 5.1 19 8.8 31 7.5 21
     25  Rubber and 
plastic 
77            3.8 3.4 48 4.4 10 4.3 16 5.7 20 3.2 9
     27  Metallurgy 26 1.3 0.8 11 3.1 7 2.9 11 3.1 11 3.6 10 
     28  Metal products 153 7.4 7.4 105 6.6 15 8.3 31 8.2 29 7.1 20 
     29  Machines, 
equipment 
172            8.4 9.5 135 4.0 9 5.1 19 6.2 22 5.0 14
  30 - 33  Electronics 125 6.1 5.8 83 4.9 11 5.6 21 7.4 26 8.2 23 
   34,35  Cars and 
Transport 
84            4.1 3.9 55 6.6 15 4.5 17 4.3 15 5.4 15
20,26,36,37  Other industry 149 7.3 7.7 110 7.1 16 5.6 21 5.4 19 5.4 15 
   40,41  Utilities 23 1.1 0.8 11 3.1 7 1.6 6 1.1 4 2.9 8 
     45  Construction 143 7.0 7.5 107 8.0 18 6.1 23 3.7 13 8.2 23 
  50 - 55  Hotel, catering 364 17.7 18.1 258 15.0 34 18.7 70 15.9 56 9.3 26 
  60 - 64  Transportation, 
storage 
86            4.2 4.6 66 3.1 7 3.5 13 4.0 14 1.1 3
  70 - 74  Business 
services 
214            10.4 9.8 140 13.3 30 10.1 38 11.1 39 12.9 36
   90,93  Environmental, 
other services 
28            1.4 1.3 19 0.9 2 1.6 6 1.7 6 1.1 3
                   
Total            2056 100.0 100.0 1426 100.0 226 100.0 375 100.0 353 100.0 280
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for different R&D cooperation profiles 
 No coop Competitor 
Coop=1 
Supplier 
Coop=1 
Customer. 
Coop=1 
University 
Coop=1 
Mean1 
Test 1 
F-value 
Mean2 
Test 2 
F-value 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
Competitor 
spillover 
0.978 1.128 1.157 1.108 1.179 3.54 5.46** 
 
Supplier spillover 
 
1.081 
 
1.031 
 
1.245 
 
1.133 
 
1.089 
 
13.63*** 
 
9.84*** 
 
Customer 
spillover 
 
1.203 
 
1.372 
 
1.456 
 
1.595 
 
1.514 
 
45.10*** 
 
44.50*** 
 
University 
spillover 
 
0.340 
 
0.546 
 
0.550 
 
0.562 
 
0.779 
 
156.45*** 
 
156.49***
 
Firm size 
 
161 
 
374 
 
465 
 
325 
 
568 
  
 
Innovation 
intensity 
 
0.027 
 
0.038 
 
0.034 
 
0.041 
 
0.051 
  
 
Foreign MNE 
 
0.189 
 
0.186 
 
0.240 
 
0.258 
 
0.221 
  
 
Domestic group 
 
0.250 
 
0.332 
 
0.315 
 
0.306 
 
0.307 
  
 
Cost Push 
 
1.906 
 
2.438 
 
2.333 
 
2.354 
 
2.564 
  
 
Demand Pull 
 
3.694 
 
4.372 
 
4.315 
 
4.462 
 
4.450 
  
 
Log(value added 
per employee)98 
 
4.459 
 
4.667 
 
4.627 
 
4.641 
 
4.670 
  
 
Log(innovative 
sales per 
employee ) 98 
 
1.389 
 
1.714 
 
1.919 
 
2.059 
 
2.013 
 
  
# observations 
(new sales 
sample) 
 
1426 
(939) 
 
226 
(154) 
 
375 
(248) 
 
353 
(238) 
 
280 
(212) 
  
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
1. The test is the comparison of the received incoming spillovers between the groups of firms that reported 
engagement in competitor (supplier, customer, university) cooperation vis-à-vis the establishments that have 
not reported such engagement.  
2. The test is the comparison of the received incoming spillovers between the groups of firms that reported 
engagement in competitor (supplier, customer, university) vis-à-vis the establishments that have reported no 
cooperation links at all. 
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Table 3. Regression results for productivity growth, 1996-1998 
 
 
Growth value added per employee 
(growth labour productivity) 
Growth new to the market sales per 
employee 
(growth innovative sales productivity) 
 (1) (2) (3)+ (4) (5) (6)+
       
R&D Cooperation 0.0593*** 
(0.0225) 
  0.1823* 
(0.1055) 
  
Competitor 
Cooperation 
 0.0747** 
(0.0364) 
0.1122* 
(0.0604) 
 -0.1611 
(0.1698) 
0.4922* 
(0.2757) 
Supplier Cooperation  0.0208 
(0.0308) 
0.1079** 
(0.0444) 
 -0.0119 
(0.1469) 
-0.0978 
(0.1941) 
Customer 
Cooperation 
 -0.0110 
(0.0320) 
-0.0268 
(0.0456) 
 0.0780 
(0.1479) 
0.2477 
(0.1940) 
University 
Cooperation 
 0.0214 
(0.0351) 
0.0676 
(0.0472) 
 0.3239** 
(0.1614) 
0.5066** 
(0.2003) 
Incoming spillovers 0.0080*** 
(0.0022) 
  0.0521*** 
(0.0101) 
  
Competitor 
spillovers 
 0.0138 
(0.0125) 
0.0064 
(0.0078) 
 -0.0507 
(0.0571) 
-0.0482 
(0.0567) 
Supplier spillovers  0.0135 
0.0120) 
-0.0024 
(0.0076) 
 -0.0254 
(0.0562) 
-0.0301 
(0.0563) 
Customer spillovers  0.0034 
(0.0115) 
-0.0012 
(0.0072) 
 0.1706*** 
(0.0523) 
0.1726*** 
(0.0521) 
University spillovers  0.0310 
(0.0195) 
0.0069* 
(0.0040) 
 0.2553*** 
(0.0849) 
0.2176*** 
(0.0846) 
Firm size 0.0127 
(0.0092) 
0.0148 
(0.0093) 
0.0133 
(0.0092) 
0.0889* 
(0.0480) 
0.1127** 
(0.0483) 
0.0814* 
(0.0477) 
Innovation intensity 0.0054*** 
(0.0009) 
0.0055*** 
(0.0009) 
0.0055*** 
(0.0009) 
0.0612 
(0.6149) 
0.1025 
(0.6207) 
0.0007 
(0.6185) 
Foreign MNE 0.1332*** 
(0.0278) 
0.1420*** 
(0.0280) 
0.1363*** 
(0.0280) 
0.1712 
(0.1296) 
0.2164* 
(0.1313) 
0.2346* 
(0.1302) 
Domestic group 0.0431* 
(0.0237) 
0.0472** 
(0.0238) 
0.0426 
(0.0238) 
-0.1499 
(0.1099) 
-0.1283 
(0.1102) 
-0.1576 
(0.1096) 
Cost push innovation 0.0072 
(0.0061) 
0.0067 
(0.0061) 
0.0073 
(0.0062) 
-0.0672** 
0.0277 
-0.0602** 
(0.0278) 
-0.0586** 
(0.0277) 
Demand pull 
innovation 
0.0038 
(0.0069) 
0.0052 
(0.0070) 
0.0053 
(0.0072) 
0.0590* 
(0.0340) 
0.0587* 
(0.0343) 
0.0607* 
(0.0340) 
Log(productivity) 
1996 
-0.5252*** 
(0.0155) 
-0.5218*** 
(0.0155) 
-0.5245*** 
(0.0155) 
-0.7231*** 
(0.0270) 
-0.7163*** 
(0.0272) 
-.7200*** 
(0.0270) 
       
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.37 0.37 0.37 
Number of obs. 2056 2056 2056 1360 1360 1360 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in parentheses 
+ Cooperation variables in columns (2) and (5) take a value of one if an establishment indicated that it was engaged 
in a particular strategy in the 1996 survey (within the period 1994-1996). Cooperation variables in columns (3) and 
(6) take a value of one if firms engaged in persistent cooperation: cooperation in the two consecutive surveys, 1994-
1996 and 1996-1998. 
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Appendix A: Description of Variables 
# variable name Definition 
   
1 Competitor cooperation 1 if the business unit reported engagement in innovation in 
cooperation strategy with competitors, else zero  
2 Supplier cooperation 1 if the business unit reported engagement in innovation in 
cooperation strategy with suppliers, else zero  
3 Customer cooperation 1 if the business unit reported engagement in innovation in 
cooperation strategy with customers, else zero  
4 University cooperation 1 if the business unit has reported engagement in innovation in 
cooperation strategy with universities, innovation centers, or 
research institutions, else zero  
5 Competitor incoming spillover Importance of competitors as source of knowledge for the 
firm’s innovation process. Constructed as residual from the 
auxiliary regression of competitor spillover taken from 1998 
survey on a competitor cooperation dummy taken from 1996 
survey. 
6 Supplier incoming spillover Importance of suppliers as source of knowledge for the firm’s 
innovation process. Constructed as residual from the auxiliary 
regression of supplier spillover taken from 1998 survey on a 
supplier cooperation dummy taken from 1996 survey.  
7 Customer incoming spillover Importance of customers as source of knowledge for the firm’s 
innovation process. Constructed as residual from the auxiliary 
regression of customer spillover taken from 1998 survey on a 
supplier cooperation dummy taken from 1996 survey.  
8 University incoming spillover Average of importance of universities, innovation centers, and 
research institutions as source of knowledge for the firm’s 
innovation process. Constructed as residual from the auxiliary 
regression of university spillover taken from 1998 survey on a 
university cooperation dummy taken from 1996 survey. 
9 Innovation intensity Total innovation expenditures/sales 
10 Firm size Logarithm of number of employees 
11 Domestic group 1 if the business unit is part of a domestic firm grouping, else 
0 
12 Foreign MNE 1 if the firm is affiliate of a foreign MNE, else 0 
13 Cost push Importance of cost-saving objectives for the firm’s 
innovations Constructed as a sum of scores on 4 categories of 
objectives, relating to processes, labour, materials, and energy. 
14 Demand pull Importance of demand-enhancing objectives for the firm’s 
innovations. Constructed as sum of scores on 2 categories of 
objectives, relating to products quality and new products and 
markets.  
 Productivity growth (value 
added) 
Growth in the net value added per employee = log (labour 
productivity 1998) – log (labour productivity 1996) 
 Productivity growth (new 
sales) 
Growth in the value of sales new to the market per employee 
1996-1998 = log (1+ new sales/employees 1998) – log (1+ 
new sales/employees 1996) 
Note: all independent variables are for 1996 except for the spillover variables 
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Appendix B: Correlations  
 
(N=2056) 
 (1)               (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
 COcoop               Scoop CUcoop Ucoop COspill Sspill CUspill Uspill Fsize INNint MNE Domgr Cpush Dpull prodv
1  1.000         
             
      
2  .3293   1.000 
3  .3678   .4964   1.000             
4  .4408   .4037   .4096   1.000            
5 -.0154  .0524   .0162   .0395   1.000           
6 -.0422  .0192   .0022  -.0117   .3292   1.000          
7 -.0092  .0253   .0062   .0373   .3931   .2900   1.000         
8 -.0246   .0281   .0240   .0087   .2332   .1689  .1740   1.000        
9  .1614   .2266   .1562   .2544   .1164   .0377  .0581   .1056   1.000       
10 -.0074  -.0099  -.0098  -.0084   .0263   .0008  -.0056  -.0127  -.0840   1.000      
11 -.0144   .0443   .0628   .0189   .0210  -.0244 -.0098  -.0294   .2204  -.0113  1.000     
12  .0486   .0470   .0364   .0328  -.0028   .0254   .0286   .0185   .0903  -.0137 -.3066   1.000    
13  .0855   .0876   .0896   .1244   .1201   .0790   .0818   .0909   .1205  -.0244  .1104  -.0074  1.000   
14  .1196   .1430   .1820   .1556   .1025   .0534   .1453   .0564   .0771  -.0265  .0791  -.0055  .2689  1.000  
15  .0683   .0842   .1078   .1153   .0478  -.0228   .0373   .0217   .0983  -.0940  .1513   .0350  .0694  .0628  1.000 
 
 
N=1360 
 (1)               (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
                Ccoop Scoop CUcoop Ucoop COspill Sspill CUspill Uspill Fsizel INNint MNE Domgr Cpush Dpull prodv
1  1.000               
               
        
2  .3541  1.000
3  .3667  .5142   1.000             
4  .4925  .4795  .4316   1.000            
5 -.0262  .0960  .0203   .0721  1.000           
6 -.0281  .0430  .0118  .0179 .3176  1.000          
7 -.0025  .0470  -.0020  .0452 .3771 .2630  1.000         
8 -.0358  .0342  .0320  -.0041 .2597 .1881  .1802  1.000
9 .2073  .2809  .2112   .3349 .1878 .0482 .1006  .1107  1.000       
10  .0169  .0099  .0240  .0227 -.0061 -.0486 -.0217  .0852 -.1349   1.000      
11 -.0385  .0657  .0909  .0268 .0565 -.0097 -.0168 -.0221  .2863  -.0032  1.000     
12 .0932  .0715  .0450  .0424 .0290  .0159  .0779  .0228  .0903   .0004 -.3078  1.000    
13 .0911  .1089  .1211  .1488 .1231  .0935  .0792  .1022  .2093  -.0107  .1385 .0059  1.000   
14 .1279  .1580  .1923  .1709 .1171  .0705  .1511  .0795  .1434   .0906  .0894 -.0066 .3096  1.000  
15 .0754  .1587  .2116   .1097 .0556  .0336  .0989  .0660 -.0043   .0817  .0576 -.0119 .0640  .2337 1.00 
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